WALGREEN COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SARA CREEK PROPERTY COMPANY,
B.V., a/k/a SARA CREEK BETA, and PHAR-MOR CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 91-3519
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
966 F.2d 273; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14847
April 17, 1992, Argued
June 29, 1992, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 91 C 165--Thomas J. Curran, Judge.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
JUDGES: Before POSNER and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and WOOD, JR., Senior Circuit
Judge.
OPINION:
POSNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal from the grant of a permanent Injunction
raises fundamental issues concerning the propriety of injunctive relief. The essential
facts are simple. Walgreen has operated a pharmacy in the Southgate Mall in Milwaukee
since its opening in 1951. Its current lease, signed In 1971 and carrying a 30-year,
6-month term, contains, as had the only previous lease, a clause in which the landlord,
Sara Creek, promises not to lease space in the mall to anyone else who wants to operate a
pharmacy or a store containing a pharmacy. Such an exclusivity clause, common in
shopping-center leases, is occasionally challenged on antitrust grounds ... --implausibly
enough, given the competition among malls; but that is an issue for another day, since in
this appeal Sara Creek does not press the objection it made below to the clause on
antitrust grounds.
In 1990, fearful that its largest tenant--what in real estate parlance is called the
"anchor tenant"--having gone broke was about to close its store, Sara Creek
informed Walgreen that it intended to buy out the anchor tenant and install in its place a
discount store operated by Phar-Mor Corporation, a "deep discount" chain, rather
than, like Walgreen, just a "discount" chain. Phar-Mor's store would occupy
100,000 square feet, of which 12,000 would be occupied by a pharmacy the same size as
Walgreen's. The entrances to the two stores would be within a couple of hundred feet of
each other.
Walgreen filed this diversity suit for breach of contract against Sara Creek and Phar-Mor
and asked for an injunction against Sara Creek's letting the anchor premises to Phar-Mor.
After an evidentiary hearing, the judge found a breach of Walgreen's lease and entered a
permanent injunction against Sara Creek's letting the anchor tenant premises to Phar-Mor
until the expiration of Walgreen's lease. He did this over the defendants' objection that
Walgreen had failed to show that its remedy at law--damages--for the breach of the
exclusivity clause was inadequate. Sara Creek had put on an expert witness who testified
that Walgreen's damages could be readily estimated, and Walgreen had countered with
evidence from its employees that its damages would be very difficult to compute, among
other reasons because they included intangibles such as loss of goodwill.
Sara Creek reminds us that damages are the norm in breach of contract as in other cases.
Many breaches, it points out, are "efficient," in the sense that they allow
resources to be moved into a more valuable use.... Perhaps this is one--the value of
Phar-Mor's occupancy of the anchor premises may exceed the cost to Walgreen of facing
increased competition. If so, society will be better off if Walgreen is paid its damages,
equal to that cost, and Phar-Mor is allowed to move in rather than being kept out by an
injunction. That is why injunctions are not granted as a matter of course, but only when
the plaintiff's damages remedy is inadequate.... Walgreen's is not, Sara Creek argues; the
projection of business losses due to increased competition is a routine exercise in
calculation. Damages representing either the present value of lost future profits or
(what should be the equivalent ...) the diminution in the value of the leasehold have
either been awarded or deemed the proper remedy in a number of reported cases for breach
of an exclusivity clause in a shopping-center lease....Why, Sara Creek asks, should they
not be adequate here?
Sara Creek makes a beguiling argument that contains much truth, but we do not think it
should carry the day. For if, as just noted, damages have been awarded in some cases of
breach of an exclusivity clause in a shopping-center lease, injunctions have been issued
in others.... The task of striking the balance is for the trial judge, subject to
deferential appellate review in recognition of its particularistic, judgmental, fact-bound
character.... As we said in an appeal from a grant of a preliminary injunction--but the
point is applicable to review of a permanent injunction as well--"The question for us
[appellate judges] is whether the [district] judge exceeded the bounds of permissible
choice in the circumstances, not what we would have done if we had been in his
shoes...."
The plaintiff who seeks an injunction has the burden of persuasion--damages are the norm,
so the plaintiff must show why his case is abnormal. But when, as in this case, the issue
is whether to grant a permanent injunction, not whether to grant a temporary one, the
burden is to show that damages are inadequate, not that the denial of the injunction will
work irreparable harm. "Irreparable" in the injunction context means
not rectifiable by the entry of a final judgment.... It has nothing to do with
whether to grant a permanent injunction, which, in the usual case anyway, is the final
judgment. The use of "irreparable harm" or "irreparable injury" as
synonyms for inadequate remedy at law is a confusing usage. It should be avoided....
The benefits of substituting an injunction for damages are twofold. First, it shifts the
burden of determining the cost of the defendant's conduct from the court to the parties.
If it is true that Walgreen's damages are smaller than the gain to Sara Creek from
allowing a second pharmacy into the shopping mall, then there must be a price for
dissolving the injunction that will make both parties better off. Thus, the effect of
upholding the injunction would be to substitute for the costly processes of forensic fact
determination the less costly processes of private negotiation. Second, a premise of our
free-market system, and the lesson of experience here and abroad as well, is that
prices and costs are more accurately determined by the market than by government. A battle
of experts is a less reliable method of determining the actual cost to Walgreen of facing
new competition than negotiations between Walgreen and Sara Creek over the price at which
Walgreen would feel adequately compensated for having to face that competition.
That is the benefit side of injunctive relief but there is a cost side as well. Many
injunctions require continuing supervision by the court, and that is costly.... A request
for specific performance (a form of mandatory injunction) of a franchise was refused on
this ground in North American Financial Group, Ltd. v. S.M.R. Enterprises, Inc.,
583 F. Supp. 691, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1984).... This ground was also stressed in Rental
Development Corp. v. Lavery, 304 F.2d 839, 841-42 (9th Cir. 1962), a case involving a
lease. Some injunctions are problematic because they impose costs on third parties.... A
more subtle cost of injunctive relief arises from the situation that economists call
"bilateral monopoly," in which two parties can deal only with each other: the
situation that an injunction creates.... The sole seller of widgets selling to the sole
buyer of that product would be an example. But so will be the situation confronting
Walgreen and Sara Creek if the injunction is upheld. Walgreen can "sell" its
injunctive right only to Sara Creek, and Sara Creek can "buy" Walgreen's
surrender of its right to enjoin the leasing of the anchor tenant's space to Phar-Mor only
from Walgreen. The lack of alternatives in bilateral monopoly creates a bargaining range,
and the costs of negotiating to a point within that range may be high. Suppose the cost to
Walgreen of facing the competition of Phar-Mor at the Southgate Mall would be $ 1 million,
and the benefit to Sara Creek of leasing to Phar-Mor would be $ 2 million. Then at any
price between those figures for a waiver of Walgreen's injunctive right both parties would
be better off, and we expect parties to bargain around a judicial assignment of legal
rights if the assignment is inefficient. R.H. Coase, "The Problem of Social
Cost," 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). But each of the parties would like to
engross as much of the bargaining range as possible--Walgreen to press the price toward $
2 million, Phar-Mor to depress it toward $ 1 million. With so much at stake, both parties
will have an incentive to devote substantial resources of time and money to the
negotiation process. The process may even break down, if one or both parties wants to
create for future use a reputation as a hard bargainer; and if it does break down, the
injunction will have brought about an inefficient result. All these are in one form
or another costs of the injunctive process that can be avoided by substituting damages.
The costs and benefits of the damages remedy are the mirror of those of the injunctive
remedy. The damages remedy avoids the cost of continuing supervision and third-party
effects, and the cost of bilateral monopoly as well. It imposes costs of its own, however,
in the form of diminished accuracy in the determination of value, on the one hand, and of
the parties' expenditures on preparing and presenting evidence of damages, and the time of
the court in evaluating the evidence, on the other.
The weighing up of all these costs and benefits is the analytical procedure that is or at
least should be employed by a judge asked to enter a permanent injunction, with the
understanding that if the balance is even the injunction should be withheld. The judge is
not required to explicate every detail of the analysis and he did not do so here, but as
long we are satisfied that his approach is broadly consistent with a proper analysis we
shall affirm; and we are satisfied here. The determination of Walgreen's damages would
have been costly in forensic resources and inescapably inaccurate.... The lease had ten
years to run. So Walgreen would have had to project its sales revenues and costs over the
next ten years, and then project the impact on those figures of Phar-Mor's competition,
and then discount that impact to present value. All but the last step would have been
fraught with uncertainty.
We may have given too little weight to such uncertainties in American Dairy Queen Corp.
v. Brown-Port Co., 621 F.2d 255, 257 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1980), but in that case the strict
judge had found that the remedy at law was adequate in the circumstances and the movant
had failed to make its best argument for inadequacy in the district court. Id. at
259. It is difficult to forecast the profitability of a retail store over a decade, let
alone to assess the impact of a particular competitor on that profitability over that
period. Of course one can hire an expert to make such predictions, ... and if injunctive
relief is infeasible the expert's testimony may provide a tolerable basis for an award of
damages. We cited cases in which damages have been awarded for the breach of an
exclusivity clause in a shopping-center lease. But they are awarded in such circumstances
not because anyone thinks them a clairvoyant forecast but because it is better to give a
wronged person a crude remedy than none at all. It is the same theory on which damages are
awarded for a disfiguring injury. No one thinks such injuries readily monetizable, ... but
a crude estimate is better than letting the wrongdoer get off scot-free (which, not
incidentally, would encourage more such injuries).... Sara Creek presented evidence of
what happened (very little) to Walgreen when Phar-Mor moved into other shopping malls in
which Walgreen has a pharmacy, and it was on the right track in putting in comparative
evidence. But there was a serious question whether the other malls were actually
comparable to the Southgate Mall, so we cannot conclude, in the face of the district
judge's contrary conclusion, that the existence of comparative evidence dissolved the
difficulties of computing damages in this case. Sara Creek complains that the judge
refused to compel Walgreen to produce all the data that Sara Creek needed to demonstrate
the feasibility of forecasting Walgreen's damages. Walgreen resisted, on grounds of the
confidentiality of the data and the cost of producing the massive data that Sara Creek
sought. Those are legitimate grounds; and the cost (broadly conceived) they expose of
pretrial discovery, in turn presaging complexity at trial, is itself a cost of the damages
remedy that injunctive relief saves.
Damages are not always costly to compute, or difficult to compute accurately. In the
standard case of a seller's breach of a contract for the sale of goods where the buyer
covers by purchasing the same product in the market, damages are readily calculable by
subtracting the market price from the contract price and multiplying by the quantity
specified in the contract. But this is not such a case and here damages would be a costly
and inaccurate remedy; and on the other side of the balance some of the costs of an
injunction are absent and the cost that is present seems low. The injunction here, like
one enforcing a covenant not to compete..., is a simple negative injunction--Sara Creek is
not to lease space in the Southgate Mall to Phar-Mor during the term of Walgreen's lease
and the costs of judicial supervision and enforcement should be negligible. There is no
contention that the injunction will harm an unrepresented third party. It may harm
Phar-Mor but that harm will be reflected in Sara Creek's offer to Walgreen to dissolve the
injunction. (Anyway Phar-Mor is a party.) The injunction may also, it is true, harm
potential customers of Phar-Mor--people who would prefer to shop at a deep-discount store
than an ordinary discount store--but their preferences, too, are registered indirectly.
The more business Phar-Mor would have, the more rent it will be willing to pay Sara
Creek, and therefore the more Sara Creek will be willing to pay Walgreen to dissolve the
injunction.
The only substantial cost of the injunction in this case is that it may set off a round of
negotiations between the parties. In some cases, illustrated by Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970), this consideration alone would be
enough to warrant the denial of injunctive relief. The defendant's factory was emitting
cement dust that caused the plaintiffs harm monetized at less than $ 200,000, and the only
way to abate the harm would have been to close down the factory, which had cost $ 45
million to build. An injunction against the nuisance could therefore have created a huge
bargaining range (could, not would, because it is unclear what the current value of the
factory was), and the costs of negotiating to a point within it might have been immense.
If the market value of the factory was actually $ 45 million, the plaintiffs would be
tempted to hold out for a price to dissolve the injunction in the tens of millions and the
factory would be tempted to refuse to pay anything more than a few hundred thousand
dollars. Negotiations would be unlikely to break down completely, given such a bargaining
range, but they might well be protracted and costly. There is nothing so dramatic here.
Sara Creek does not argue that it will have to close the mall if enjoined from leasing to
Phar-Mor. Phar-Mor is not the only potential anchor tenant. Liza Danielle, Inc. v.
Jamko, Inc., 408 So. 2d 735, 740 (Fla. App. 1982), on which Sara Creek relies,
presented the converse case where the grant of the injunction would have forced an
existing tenant to close its store. The size of the bargaining range was also a factor in
the denial of injunctive relief in Gitlitz v. Plankinton Building Properties, Inc.,
228 Wis. 334, 339-40, 280 N.W. 415, 418 (1938).
To summarize, the judge did not exceed the bounds of reasonable judgment in concluding
that the costs (including forgone benefits) of the damages remedy would exceed the costs
(including forgone benefits) of an injunction. We need not consider whether, as intimated
by Walgreen, exclusivity clauses in shopping-center leases should be considered
presumptively enforceable by injunctions. Although we have described the choice between
legal and equitable remedies as one for case-by-case determination, the courts have
sometimes picked out categories of case in which injunctive relief is made the norm. The
best-known example is specific performance of contracts for the sale of real property....
The rule that specific performance will be ordered in such cases as a matter of course is
a generalization of the considerations discussed above. Because of the absence of a fully
liquid market in real property and the frequent presence of subjective values (many a
homeowner, for example, would not sell his house for its market value), the calculation of
damages is difficult; and since an order of specific performance to convey a piece of
property does not create a continuing relation between the parties, the costs of
supervision and enforcement if specific performance is ordered are slight. The
exclusivity clause in Walgreen's lease relates to real estate, but we hesitate to suggest
that every contract Involving real estate should be enforceable as a matter of course by
injunctions. Suppose Sara Creek had covenanted to keep the entrance to Walgreen's store
free of ice and snow, and breached the covenant. An injunction would require continuing
supervision, and it would be easy enough if the injunction were denied for Walgreen to
hire its own ice and snow remover and charge the cost to Sara Creek.... On the other hand,
injunctions to enforce exclusivity clauses are quite likely to be justifiable by just the
considerations present here--damages are difficult to estimate with any accuracy and the
injunction is a one-shot remedy requiring no continuing judicial involvement. So there is
an argument for making injunctive relief presumptively appropriate in such cases, but we
need not decide in this case how strong an argument.
AFFIRMED.
CONCUR: WOOD, JR., Senior Circuit Judge, concurring. I gladly join in the
affirmance reached in Judge Posner's expert analysis.