GLOVER v. JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF UNITED STATES, POST NO. 58
No. 830
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
68 A.2d 233; 1949 D.C. App. LEXIS 232
Argued July 18, 1949
August 10, 1949
OPINION: CLAGETT, Associate Judge. The issue determinative of this
appeal is whether a person giving information leading to the arrest of a murderer without
any knowledge that a reward has been offered for such information by a non-governmental
organization is entitled to collect the reward. The trial court decided the question in
the negative and instructed the jury to return a verdict for defendant. Claimant appeals
from the judgment on such instructed verdict.
The controversy grows out of the murder on June 5, 1946, of Maurice L. Bernstein, a local
pharmacist. The following day, June 6, Post No. 58, Jewish War Veterans of the United
States, communicated to the newspapers an offer of a reward of $ 500 'to the person or
persons furnishing information resulting in the apprehension and conviction of the persons
guilty of the murder of Maurice L. Bernstein.' Notice of the reward was published in the
newspaper June 7. A day or so later Jesse James Patton, one of the men suspected of
the crime, was arrested and the police received information that the other murderer was
Reginald Wheeler and that Wheeler was the 'boy friend' of a daughter of Mary Glover,
plaintiff and claimant in the present case. On the evening of June 11 the police visited
Mary Glover, who in answer to questions informed them that her daughter and Wheeler had
left the city on June 5. She told the officers she didn't know exactly where the couple
had gone, whereupon the officers asked for names of relatives whom the daughter might be
visiting. In response to such questions she gave the names and addresses of several
relatives, including one at Ridge Spring, South Carolina, which was the first place
visited by the officers and where Wheeler was arrested in company with plaintiff's
daughter on June 13. Wheeler and Patton were subsequently convicted of the crime.
Claimant's most significant testimony, in the view that we take of the case, was that she
first learned that a reward had been offered on June 12, the day after she had given the
police officers the information which enabled them to find Wheeler. Claimant's husband,
who was present during the interview with the police officers, also testified that at
the time of the interview he didn't know that any reward had been offered for Wheeler's
arrest, that nothing was said by the police officers about a reward and that he didn't
know about it 'until we looked into the paper about two or three days after that.'
We have concluded that the trial court correctly instructed the jury to return a verdict
for defendant. While there is some conflict in the decided cases on the subject of
rewards, most of such conflict has to do with rewards offered by governmental officers and
agencies. So far as rewards offered by private individuals and organizations are
concerned, there is little conflict on the rule that questions regarding such rewards are
to be based upon the law of contracts.
Since it is clear that the question is one of contract law, it follows that, at least so
far as private rewards are concerned, there can be no contract unless the claimant when
giving the desired information knew of the offer of the reward and acted with the
intention of accepting such offer; otherwise the claimant gives the information not in the
expectation of receiving a reward but rather out of a sense of public duty or other motive
unconnected with the reward. 'In the nature of the case,' according to Professor
Williston, 'it is impossible for an offeree actually to assent to an offer unless he knows
of its existence.' After stating that courts in some jurisdictions have decided to the
contrary, Williston adds, 'It is impossible, however, to find in such a case [that is, in
a case holding to the contrary] the elements generally held in England and America
necessary for the formation of a contract. If it is clear the offeror intended to pay for
the service, it is equally certain that the person rendering the service performed it
voluntarily and not in return for a promise to pay. If one person expects to buy, and the
other to give, there can hardly be found mutual assent. These views are supported by the
great weight of authority, and in most jurisdictions a plaintiff in the sort of case under
discussion is denied recovery.'
The American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Contracts follows the same
rule, thus: 'It is impossible that there should be an acceptance unless the offeree knows
of the existence of the offer.' The Restatement gives the following illustration of the
rule just stated: 'A offers a reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction
of a criminal. B, in ignorance of the offer, gives information leading to his arrest and
later, with knowledge of the offer and intent to accept it, gives other information
necessary for conviction. There is no contract.'
We have considered the reasoning in state decisions following the contrary rule. Mostly,
as we have said, they involve rewards offered by governmental bodies and in general are
based upon the theory that the government is benefited equally whether or not the claimant
gives the information with knowledge of the reward and that therefore the government
should pay in any event. We believe that the rule adopted by Professor Williston and the
Restatement and in the majority of the cases is the better reasoned rule and therefore we
adopt it. We believe furthermore that this rule is particularly applicable in the present
case since the claimant did not herself contact the authorities and volunteer information
but gave the information only upon questioning by the police officers and did not claim
any knowledge of the guilt or innocence of the criminal but only knew where he probably
could be located....
Affirmed.