Case brief: template
Case name: | Rickards v. Sun Oil Co |
Court: | SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY |
Citation; Date: | 23 N.J. Misc. 89; 41 A.2d 267; 1945 |
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY |
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Trial court: | Appeal court (for appeal cases only): | ||
Plaintiff: | Rickards | Appellant: | |
Defendant: | Sun Oil | Respondent: | |
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Facts of the case: |
All of the plaintiffs
operated business establishments in the City of Brigantine, in the County of Atlantic, and
State of New Jersey. These establishments ranged from a fishing pier and bar, hotels,
cafes, gas station and repair shop, to produce and poultry. They all seek to recover
losses from expectant gains. The negligent act of the defendant in crashing into the drawbridge which formed a part of the county highway between the Island of Brigantine and the Island of Absecon, in the County of Atlantic, and the resultant destruction of the bridge and the incident loss of utility of the bridge and the causeway pending reconstruction of the same, and that the said road (and the bridge forming a part thereof) is the only means of egress and ingress by roadway to Brigantine Island are accordingly admitted. No allegations are contained in the complaints of the knowledge of the defendant's agent (master of the barge) of the fact of the isolation of Brigantine Island. |
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Procedural history: |
...Six independent
causes of action have been instituted in the Supreme Court with venue laid in Atlantic
County by six independent plaintiffs against the same defendant.... Motions to strike out the complaint of each of the plaintiffs have been made by the defendant... |
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Court opinion (including key issues and arguments): |
For the purpose of
these motions, the defendant admits the truth of all facts well pleaded in the complaints
and the factual inferences which may be legitimately drawn therefrom. The sufficiency of
the complaints, however, must be determined from the facts therein properly alleged from
which a legal duty and the liability for the violation thereof are deducted. ... The plaintiffs pivot their right to recover upon the assertion of the proposition that the negligent conduct of the defendant resulted in the destruction of the public highway and that it amounted to a nuisance, and that it is therefore liable to an action at a suit of any person who is thereby specially damnified, and that the plaintiffs are in that category. ... It is the position of the defendant that the complaints fail to disclose causes of action against it and more particularly that (1) it owed no duty to the plaintiffs and consequently could not be guilty of any negligence as to them, and that (2) there is not alleged any legal damage proximately resulting from the breach of any duty or obligation owed the plaintiffs by the defendant. The failure of the defendant to perform its duty to the public and refrain from negligent action may be a cause of injury to the plaintiffs, but it is not the natural and proximate effect of such negligence and therefore not actionable. "The rule of law requires that the damage chargeable to a wrongdoer must be shown to be the natural and proximate effects of his delinquency. The term 'natural' imports that they are such as might reasonably have been foreseen--such as occur in an ordinary state of things; the term 'proximate' indicates that there must be no other culpable and efficient agency intervening between the defendant's dereliction and the loss. ..." The entire doctrine assumes the defendant is not necessarily to be held for all consequences of his acts. ... It is fundamental that there must be some reasonable limitation of liability for the commission of the tort. The wrongdoer is not liable in the eyes of the law for all possible consequences. He is thus responsible in damages only for the natural and probable consequence of his negligent act. Each case stands upon its own factual situation. ... If there were several avenues and roads of entrance and exit to Brigantine Island, there would be no difficulty in disposing of the motions. ... Since there was only one means of ingress and egress by road, it adds to the difficulty in disposing of the motions and causes some hesitation. The test of liability to the particular person is whether injury to him ought reasonably to have been anticipated.... Where there is no reason to expect damage to third persons in the category of the plaintiffs, and no knowledge in the person doing the wrongful act that such a state of things exists so as to render damage probable, it is generally considered that the wrongful act is not the proximate cause of injury so as to render the wrongdoer liable to an action. ... Such a restriction on the right to sue for a want of care in the exercise of employments or the transaction of business, is plainly necessary to restrain the remedy from being pushed to an impracticable extreme. There would be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies, if the ill effects of the negligences of men could be followed down the chain of results to the final effect." No ordinary prudent person could reasonably have been expected to have foreseen the resultant injurious consequences and hence there was no actionable negligence in the absence of knowledge. "Whether an act or omission alleged to be negligence naturally and proximately caused an injury, is as a rule, a question for the jury. But if there is no evidence connecting the alleged negligence with the injury, or if it is obvious that the act or omission was not the natural and proximate cause thereof, the question is for the court. 21 Am. & Eng. Encycl. L. (2d 508)." |
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Disposition of case: |
Tested by that rule and applying to it the admitted facts in the complaints, the question for decision is for the court. It is obvious that the alleged wrong was not the natural and proximate result of defendant's negligence, and the defendant is not liable. The motions are granted. |
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CASE |
Merchants on the island who saw their business dry up as a result of the collision sued the defendant but lost, on the "theory" that pure economic loss is not recoverable in an accident case. The theory doesn't make much sense, but the result may. Although the island merchants did lose money, their loss was a gain to mainland merchants who picked up business from the island merchants when customers could no longer reach the island. Since the defendant could not seek from the mainland merchants restitution of the gains he had conferred upon them, it would have been punitive to make him pay the losses of the island merchants. ... But the analysis is incomplete. It leaves out of account the customers. [get the rest of this at the office] (P185) |
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