Cook v. the minneapolis, st. paul & sault ste. marie railway company - brief

Case brief: template

Case name:	COOK and another, Respondents, v. THE MINNEAPOLIS, St. PAUL & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
Court:	SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Citation; Date:	98 Wis. 624; 74 N.W. 561; 1898

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Trial court:		Appeal court (for appeal cases only):
Plaintiff:	Cook	Appellant:	Mn railway
Defendant:	Mn railway	Respondent:	Cook

Facts of the case:
As to the origin of the fire which destroyed the plaintiff's property, there was evidence tending to show that, about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 20th of May, 1893, a fire was started in some way by a passing engine, in combustible material on the defendant's right of way near Boom Hill, a mile and a quarter southwest of Corliss, where plaintiffs' property was located; that the wind at that time was blowing from the south and southwest; that the fire spread for a time in a northerly and northeasterly direction, carried by the wind blowing from the south and southwest; that towards noon the wind changed to the west; that between 12 and 1 o'clock the wind changed so as to blow from a northwesterly direction, and increased to a gale; that at the time the fire was spreading north from Boom Hill as stated there was a fire some distance northwest of plaintiffs' property, which, as the wind changed to the west and northwest and increased to a gale, was carried southeasterly and easterly to the vicinity of such property, so as to meet the line of fire from the southwest before that reached said property; thereafter and about 1 o'clock, carried by the strong gale of wind aforesaid, fire swept down from the west and northwest, to and into said property, and caused the destruction complained of.

Remedy sought:	(1) For compensation for the destruction by a fire on the 20th day of May, 1893, of a lumber camp, several buildings, the camp equipage for a large number of men, some lumber, and a quantity of posts, poles, ties, slabs, and other personal property at Corliss, Wis., of the alleged value of $ 58,820.79, upon the ground that a fire was started at a point on defendant's right of way about a mile and a quarter south west of such property by the escape of cinders from one of defendant's engines to dry, combustible material negligently left on its right of way, which fire spread to such property and did the mischief complained of. (2) To recover for the loss of two horses of the value of $ 500, killed May 20, 1893, by one of defendant's engines, ... one horse of the alleged value of $ 225, and a cow ($50) all because they ... strayed because defendant failed to fence such right of way as required by law. The judgment prayed for was $ 60,825, with costs.

Court opinion (including key issues and arguments):
key findings at trial: (7) There was a want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant, which caused the fire to start on its right of way. (8) Such want of ordinary care consisted in not keeping the right of way reasonably clear of combustible material. (9) Plaintiffs' damage, caused by the fire started by defendant's negligence, we assess at fifty per cent. of their claim, less the insurance, amounting to $ 26,182.93. Plaintiffs' counsel moved on the verdict for such judgment as the court might decide they were entitled to. On such motion the court construed the verdict of the jury as apportioning the fire loss equally between the fire originated by the defendant and the fire that came from the northwest, which was of unknown origin, upon the theory that, as the fires united and entered the yard together, only half of the loss was attributable to the negligence of the defendant. As a matter of law the court held that as defendant's negligence in starting the Boom Hill fire contributed to produce the loss, it was responsible for the entire damage, measured by the reasonable value of the property destroyed, and legal interest thereon from the date of the fire. Thereupon judgment was ordered for the entire value of the property destroyed, less the insurance received, such value on the verdict, under the charge, being computed by the court at $ 55,865.87, and the insurance $ 1,750. Judgment was also ordered for the value of the two horses mentioned in the second cause of action as found by the jury, with interest from the time they were killed, and for the undisputed value of the horse and cow mentioned in the third and fourth causes of action, with interest from the time they were killed, amounting in all to the sum of $ 59,584.36. The trial judge, in a very elaborate opinion, delivered in disposing of the motions for judgment, gave it the same construction. He said: "Each fire reached the yard only as part of one common fire, and either in the absence of the other would have reached and fired the yard the same as the joint fire did. In that sense both reached the yard at the same time, although they united some distance away from it. Under the law governing the case it is immaterial how far away they united." From what has preceded it is apparent that the legal question presented to the trial court and decided in plaintiffs' favor, in granting their motion for judgment and denying that of the defendant, is the following: Where two independent efficient causes unite and produce an injury to another, one of which is traceable to a responsible person whose negligence set it in motion under such circumstances that he is chargeable with knowledge that it might cause an injury to another as a natural and probable result of his conduct, and the other cause is not traceable to any known responsible agent, each of which causes, however, without the concurrence of the other would produce the same injury, that is, so that the injury would happen at the same time and to the same extent regardless of the responsible agency, does a cause of action against such agency accrue to the injured person for his loss? It is believed that the solution of that question is governed by principles as old as the common law,--principles so long and firmly established, and universally recognized by all text writers and courts, that were it not for the learned discussion of the subject by the trial court, leading up to the conclusion which eventuated in the judgment appealed from, and the later learned discussion by counsel in this court to support the conclusion thus reached, the decision here would be supported by a mere statement of the law without extended discussion or citation of authorities; but such circumstances seem to furnish excuse, at least, for a somewhat different course. But it was finally determined that the person charged, known to have negligently originated one of the causes, was, as a matter of law, liable for the entire loss, though it would have happened just the same from the other efficient cause of unknown origin. To support that theory numerous cases are cited to the effect that when two or more concurring causes produce a loss, each having a responsible source, there is a joint and several liability for the entire loss. That is a doctrine too familiar to require more than to be stated.

Disposition of case:
Due exception was taken to the order. Judgment was entered in accordance with such order, from which this appeal was taken. DISPOSITION: Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CASE