Case brief: template
| Case name: | Feinberg v. The Pfeiffer Company |
| Court: | COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSOURI, ST. LOUIS DISTRICT |
| Citation; Date: | 322 S.W.2d 163; 1959 |
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY |
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| Trial court: | Appeal court (for appeal cases only): | ||
| Plaintiff: | Feinberg | Appellant: | Pfeiffer |
| Defendant: | Pfeiffer | Respondent: | Feinberg |
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| Facts of the case: | |
| This is a
suit brought in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis by plaintiff, a former employee
of the defendant corporation, on an alleged contract whereby defendant agreed to pay
plaintiff the sum of $200 per month for life upon her retirement. A jury being waived, the
case was tried by the court alone. Judgment below was for plaintiff for $5100, the amount
of the pension claimed to be due as of the date of the trial, together with interest
thereon, and defendant duly appealed. Plaintiff began working for the defendant, a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, in 1910, when she was but 17 years of age. By 1947 she had attained the position of bookkeeper, office manager, and assistant treasurer of the defendant, and owned 70 shares of its stock out of a total of 6503 shares issued and outstanding. On December 27, 1947, the annual meeting of the defendant's Board of Directors was held at the Company's offices in St. Louis, presided over by Max Lippman, its then president and largest individual stockholder.... "RESOLVED, that the salary of Anna Sacks Feinberg be increased from $350.00 to $400.00 per month and that she be afforded the privilege of retiring from active duty in the corporation at any time she may elect to see fit so to do upon retirement pay of $200.00 per month, for the remainder of her life." Plaintiff testified on cross-examination that she had no prior information that such a pension plan was contemplated, that it came as a surprise to her, and that she would have continued in her employment whether or not such a resolution had been adopted. It is clear from the evidence that there was no contract, oral or written, as to plaintiff's length of employment, and that she was free to quit, and the defendant to discharge her, at any time. Plaintiff did continue to work for the defendant through June 30, 1949, on which date she retired. In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the defendant began paying her the sum of $200 on the first of each month. Mr. Lippman died on November 18, 1949, and was succeeded as president of the company by his widow. Because of an illness, she retired from that office and was succeeded in October, 1953, by her son-in-law, Sidney M. Harris. Mr. Harris testified that while Mrs. Lippman had been president she signed the monthly pension check paid plaintiff, but fussed about doing so, and considered the payments as gifts. After his election, he stated, a new accounting firm employed by the defendant questioned the validity of the payments to plaintiff on several occasions, and in the Spring of 1956, upon its recommendation, he consulted the Company's then attorney, Mr. Ralph Kalish. Harris testified that both Ernst and Ernst, the accounting firm, and Kalish told him there was no need of giving plaintiff the money. He also stated that he had concurred in the view that the payments to plaintiff were mere gratuities rather than amounts due under a contractual obligation, and that following his discussion with the Company's attorney plaintiff was sent a check for $100 on April 1, 1956. Plaintiff declined to accept the reduced amount, and this action followed. Additional facts will be referred to later in this opinion. It is defendant's contention, in essence, that the resolution adopted by its Board of Directors was a mere promise to make a gift, and that no contract resulted either thereby, or when plaintiff retired, because there was no consideration given or paid by the plaintiff. It urges that a promise to make a gift is not binding unless supported by a legal consideration; that the only apparent consideration for the adoption of the foregoing resolution was the "many years of long and faithful service" expressed therein; and that past services are not a valid consideration for a promise. Plaintiff concedes that a promise based upon past services would be without consideration, but contends that there were two other elements which supplied the required element: First, the continuation by plaintiff in the employ of the defendant for the period from December 27, 1947, the date when the resolution was adopted, until the date of her retirement on June 30, 1949. And, second, her change of position, i.e., her retirement, and the abandonment by her of her opportunity to continue in gainful employment, made in reliance on defendant's promise to pay her $200 per month for life. We must agree with the defendant that the evidence does not support the first of these contentions. There is no language in the resolution predicating plaintiff's right to a pension upon her continued employment. But as to the second of these contentions we must agree with plaintiff. By the terms of the resolution defendant promised to pay plaintiff the sum of $200 a month upon her retirement. |
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| Remedy sought: | |
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| Court opinion (including key issues and arguments): | |
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| Disposition of case: | |
| Civil
Appeal From Action for Damages (Monetary Recovery) Affirmed |
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CASE |
| Efficiency/incentive issues discussed in the court opinion: |
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| Other efficiency/incentive issues relevant to the case: |
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| Assessment of the economic consequences of the court decision: |