Jim Whitney

Jim Whitney

Economics 357

Case brief: template

Case name:

Joseph Roman Ybarra v Lawrence C. Spangard et. Al.

Court:

Supreme Court of California

Citation; Date:

162 A.L.R. 1258; December 27, 1944

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Trial court: Superior Court of Los Angeles

Appeal court (if relevant):Supreme Court of California

Plaintiff:

Joseph Ybarra

Appellant:

Joseph Ybarra

Defendant:

Lawrence Spangard et. al.

Respondent:

Lawrence Spangard et. al.

Facts of the case:

Ybarra is filing action for damages for personal injury that allegedly occurred during the course of a surgical operation. The trial court decided in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. Ybarra was diagnosed with an appendicitis and went to the hospital for an appendectomy. The operation was to be performed by Dr. Spangard and he was assisted by many others. Ybarra was put to sleep and was cared for by multiple people. Following the operation, the plaintiff reported sharp pains in his right arm and shoulder. The pain continued to spread until he could no longer move his arm. There was a diagnosis by another doctor that believed the atrophy in Ybarra’s right arm was a result of a problem that had occurred during his appendectomy.

Remedy sought:

Damages resulting from personal injury. No dollar amount is quoted because the case will be retried.

Court opinion (including key issues and arguments):

[The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three conditions: "(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." Without the aid of the doctrine a patient who received permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of someone's negligence, would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability. If this were the state of the law of negligence, the courts, to avoid gross injustice, would be forced to invoke the principles of absolute liability, irrespective of negligence, in actions by persons suffering injuries during the course of treatment under anesthesia. But we think this juncture has not yet been reached, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is properly applicable to the case before us. The condition that the injury must not have been due to the plaintiff's voluntary action is of course fully satisfied under the evidence produced herein; and the same is true of the condition that the accident must be one which ordinarily does not occur unless someone was negligent. We have here no problem of negligence in treatment, but of distinct injury to a healthy part of the body not the subject of treatment, nor within the area covered by the operation. The decisions in this state make it clear that such circumstances raise the inference of negligence, and call upon the defendant to explain the unusual result. we do not believe that either the number or relationship of the defendants alone determines whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Every defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed for any period was bound to exercise ordinary care to see that no unnecessary harm came to him and each would be liable for failure in this regard. Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing surgical treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one of them as the person who did the alleged negligent act. It should be enough that the plaintiff can show an injury resulting from an external force applied while he lay unconscious in the hospital; this is as clear a case of identification of the instrumentality as the plaintiff may ever be able to make. Finally, it has been suggested that the hospital cases may properly be considered exceptional, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "should apply with equal force in cases wherein medical and nursing staffs take the place of machinery and may, through carelessness or lack of skill, inflict, or permit the infliction of, injury upon a patient who is thereafter in no position to say how he received his injuries." We do not at this time undertake to state the extent to which the reasoning of this case may be applied to other situations in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. We merely hold that where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.]

Disposition of case:

Judgement is reversed. Plaintiff is awarded damages.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

The economic analysis of this case would rely mostly upon the Court’s decision to award damages to the Plaintiff despite the fact that he was unable to exactly determine which person caused him the harm. This determination would likely cause any future operators and their assistance to assure that each party is without a doubt taking the necessary precautions. In other words, this makes each doctor and their workers responsible for one another, or risk be faced with litigation for one of their counterpart’s mistake. If the Court would have ruled in the opposite direction as to find that because the Plaintiff was unable to accurately determine at which point and which person was the cause for damages it would be unfair to punish all of them. This would have extremely detrimental results to patients who become the victim of malpractice as it gives a doctor that does commit and error a huge incentive not to come forward and admit his mistake. This is due to the fact that if the patient is unable to certainly determine the doctor who commited the act they have the chance they may not be accused. This could create recklessness and procedures that may not normally occur, as a moral hazard would exist.

Case name:	Joseph Roman Ybarra v Lawrence C. Spangard et. Al.
Court:	Supreme Court of California
Citation; Date:	162 A.L.R. 1258; December 27, 1944

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Trial court: Superior Court of Los Angeles		Appeal court (if relevant):Supreme Court of California
Plaintiff:	Joseph Ybarra	Appellant:	Joseph Ybarra
Defendant:	Lawrence Spangard et. al.	Respondent:	Lawrence Spangard et. al.

Facts of the case:
Ybarra is filing action for damages for personal injury that allegedly occurred during the course of a surgical operation. The trial court decided in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. Ybarra was diagnosed with an appendicitis and went to the hospital for an appendectomy. The operation was to be performed by Dr. Spangard and he was assisted by many others. Ybarra was put to sleep and was cared for by multiple people. Following the operation, the plaintiff reported sharp pains in his right arm and shoulder. The pain continued to spread until he could no longer move his arm. There was a diagnosis by another doctor that believed the atrophy in Ybarra’s right arm was a result of a problem that had occurred during his appendectomy.

Remedy sought:	Damages resulting from personal injury. No dollar amount is quoted because the case will be retried.

Court opinion (including key issues and arguments):
[The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three conditions: "(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." Without the aid of the doctrine a patient who received permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of someone's negligence, would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability. If this were the state of the law of negligence, the courts, to avoid gross injustice, would be forced to invoke the principles of absolute liability, irrespective of negligence, in actions by persons suffering injuries during the course of treatment under anesthesia. But we think this juncture has not yet been reached, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is properly applicable to the case before us. The condition that the injury must not have been due to the plaintiff's voluntary action is of course fully satisfied under the evidence produced herein; and the same is true of the condition that the accident must be one which ordinarily does not occur unless someone was negligent. We have here no problem of negligence in treatment, but of distinct injury to a healthy part of the body not the subject of treatment, nor within the area covered by the operation. The decisions in this state make it clear that such circumstances raise the inference of negligence, and call upon the defendant to explain the unusual result. we do not believe that either the number or relationship of the defendants alone determines whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Every defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed for any period was bound to exercise ordinary care to see that no unnecessary harm came to him and each would be liable for failure in this regard. Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing surgical treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one of them as the person who did the alleged negligent act. It should be enough that the plaintiff can show an injury resulting from an external force applied while he lay unconscious in the hospital; this is as clear a case of identification of the instrumentality as the plaintiff may ever be able to make. Finally, it has been suggested that the hospital cases may properly be considered exceptional, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "should apply with equal force in cases wherein medical and nursing staffs take the place of machinery and may, through carelessness or lack of skill, inflict, or permit the infliction of, injury upon a patient who is thereafter in no position to say how he received his injuries." We do not at this time undertake to state the extent to which the reasoning of this case may be applied to other situations in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. We merely hold that where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.]

Disposition of case:
Judgement is reversed. Plaintiff is awarded damages.