V. Tort law
D. Liability
3.
Strict liability (cont'd.)
in McDaniel
v. McNeil Lab. Inc., (1976), FDA approval
with full disclosure by McDaniel Labs was deemed sufficient for ensuring lack of defect
"While approval by the Food and Drug Administration is not
necessarily conclusive, its determinations, based upon the opinions and judgment of its
own experts, should not be subject to challenge in a product liability case simply because
some other experts may differ in their opinions as to whether a particular drug is
reasonably safe, unless there is some proof of fraud or nondisclosure of relevant
information by the manufacturer at the time of obtaining or retaining such federal
approval."
=> as with customary behavior, government approval is relevant but
not conclusive
Product liability also allows a defense based on misuse: Per Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola: "The manufacturer's liability should, of course, be defined in terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use, and should not extend to injuries that cannot be traced to the product as it reached the market."
However, product liability can => that
manufacturer must anticipate "foreseeable misuse."
A manufacturer sells a machine whose moving parts are not shielded, and
a worker is injured when he sticks his hand in them. He was careless in doing so, the
danger being apparent, and yet the manufacturer could have shielded the moving parts, and
thus prevented the accident, at a trivial cost. In many states, he would be held liable to
the worker. (P183)
4. Joint liability
Summers v. Tice 33 Cal. 2d 80 (1948)
illustrates
joint torts => multiple possible or actual causes
court decision:
"each defendant is liable for the whole damage whether they are deemed to be
acting in concert or independently."
the plaintiff is not denied relief "simply because he cannot prove
how much damage each did, when it is certain that between them they did all...."
usual legal rule: defendants are subject to
"joint | and several liability | with contribution" |
Victim can sue all injurers... | or any of the injurers for the full damage, | with compensation from each injurer subtracted from the total balance owed. |
![]() |
"with contribution"
limits recovery to value of loss
In Summers v. Tice: "The wrongdoers should be left to work out
between themselves any apportionment."
What inefficiency could result if the victim collected the full loss from both?
Economic analysis of joint liability:
Ex: seatbelts--contracted out
by a carmaker: effectiveness depends on how well they are constructed and how well they
are anchored
both parties can help avoid injury, but the injury is external to both
expected loss = P(s1,s2) x L cost of safegaurds = C(s1) + C(s2) Goal: make both choose the efficient level of precautions: |dP/dSi| x L = MCsi, i = 1, 2 Efficiency => make each negligent party liable for the full amount of damages |
![]() |
![]() |
Notice how this parallels
victim fault: it doesn't matter how the allocation is made, since each party can escape
entire liability by avoiding negligence, each has incentives to take all cost-effective
safeguards.
Only negligent parties will be left with the tab
Since it is not economically rational to be negligent, each must
anticipate being the only negligent party and therefore responsible for the entire loss.
Ybarra v. Spangard 25 Cal. 2d 486 (1944)
Illustrates that in cases of joint liability, the common burden of proof can be shifted and defendants may face the burden of proof
that none of them were negligent.
"We merely hold that where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries
while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants who had any
control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may
properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of
their conduct."