IV. Contracts
E. Breaking contracts
1. Economic analysis of breach of contract (cont'd.)
b. Efficient reliance
Real-world complication: since
breach is a possibility in contracts, contracting parties should anticipate that
possibility.
If you are guaranteed recovery for spending in reliance on a contract,
then you are insured against any preparatory expenditures you make --> moral hazard
"Both expectation damages and
reliance damages result in an inefficiently high level of reliance. (F167)
Contract damages should be structured to ensure efficient reliance.
MBf versus
MBb p = probability of breach --> MBe (expected MB) = p.MBb + (1-p).MBf Result 1: efficient reliance: MBe = MC Result 2: efficient damages: |
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As always, we face lots of uncertainty and complications in practice, but perfect expectation damages gives us our benchmark
Example: under the doctrine of mitigation of damages, [the law] would not give a supplier damages for costs ... incurred in continuing production after notice of contract termination." (P119)
2. The law regarding breach of contract
a. Impossibility
Goebel (d) v. Linn (p) 47 Mich 489 (1882)
An involuntary breach: performance is impossible at a reasonable cost. (P119)
A renegotiated
contract is not a breach of the original contract without duress.
This case illustrates
necessity but not duress: dire straits of the defendant, but not due to the conduct of the
plaintiff.
Plaintiff retains the usual remedy of suing for damages instead of
renegotiating.
b. Specific performance
Walgreen v. Sara Creek, 966 F.2d 273 (1992) -- Posner opinion; approved an injunction vs. damages for breach of contract [essentially a specific performance requirement]
specific performance is a property rule. (F164) --you need the other party's permission to breach the contract.
Advantages:
Market determines damages
Avoids litigation costs and errors
Disadvantages: Risk of inefficiency due to bilateral monopoly
Requires court monitoring of performance
"The results of decreeing
specific performance are not catastrophic, since the seller can always pay the buyer to
surrender the right of specific performance and presumably will do so if a substitute
transfer would yield a higher price. But the additional negotiation will not be
costless." (P131)
"But specific performance, like other equitable remedies, requires
the court to keep the case on its docket until performance is complete, so that if
necessary it can respond to the plaintiff's argument that the defendant is failing to
perform in good faith." (P132)
"Specific performance is
an uncommon rule except in contracts for the sale of real property." [An example of a case where specific performance was
granted for a contract not involving real estate (involving, in fact, the supplying of
tomatoes, which were in short supply) is Curtice Borthers Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J. Eq. 831,
66 A. 935 (1907).] (F164)
"courts are reluctant to enforce specific performance of
contracts, usually preferring to permit breach and award damages, calculated by the court
or agreed on in advance by the parties." (ex: customized cams: MB=110K; MC=90K; MC
after factory burns: $1M; contract price = 100K) (F93-4)
c. Liability for damages
Per Oliver Wendell Holmes:
"The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it--and nothing else."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462
(1897)(P119n)
Hawkins v. McGee 84 N.H. 114 (1929) (appellant not specified)
Hawkins v. McGee explicitly illustrates that the law recognizes expectation damages not reliance damages as the appropriate measure--you must move the promisee to the indifference curve that would have resulted without breach of contract.
Trial court: "the
plaintiff ... is entitled to recover for ... what injury he has sustained over
and above what injury he had before."
= reliance damages
Appellate court: The purpose of the law is "to put the
plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the defendant kept
his contract.". . . The measure of recovery "is
based upon what the defendant should have given the plaintiff, not what the
plaintiff has given the defendant or otherwise expended.". . . "The
only losses that can be said fairly to come within the terms of a contract are
such as the parties must have had in mind when the contract was made, or such as
they either knew or ought to have known would probably result from a failure to
comply with its terms.". . . We therefore conclude that the true measure of
the plaintiff's damage in the present case is the difference between the value
to him of a perfect hand or a good hand, such as the jury found the defendant
promised him, and the value of his hand in its present condition, including any
incidental consequences fairly within the contemplation of the parties when they
made their contract . . .
= expectation damages
The expectation measure of damages
focuses on the gain that the victim of the breach anticipated from performance of the
contract, the reliance measure on the victim's loss from the breach.
If reliance costs were the exclusive measure of damages, it
would follow that parties could walk away from their contracts whenever the contracts were
still purely executory. (P122)
Expectation damages = the
efficient measure of damages
For that: The court should have included pain and suffering beyond what is
customary in such surgeries.
The same in business cases as
well:
"Usually the objective of giving the promisor an incentive to
fillfill his promise unless the result would be an inefficient use of resources ... can be
achieved by givng the promisee his expected profit on the transaction. " (P120)
Victims must mitigate damages.
Example: If a tenant breaks a lease, the tenant is responsible only for
the rent net of any rental income from a replacement tenant. (P123)
But a defaulting purchaser is responsible for the entire loss of profit
on the unpurchased units since firms typically have excess capacity to serve other
customers (P123)
Do any movie
trivia buffs recognize this case?
from "The Paper Chase"
(1972)
According to the Harvard Law School Record (1978): George Hawkins went on to lead a miserable reclusive life, and Dr. McGee went on to be elected mayor of Brattleboro, Vt. for several terms.