IV. Contracts
D. Interpreting contracts
1. filling gaps in contracts
(2) Unforeseen
and unprovided for events (cont'd.)
Per Greenfiel v. Kolea: [A]n allocation of risk can be accomplished in one of two ways. First, the parties could specifically provide for risk assumption with respect to certain possible contingencies. In the absence of an express recognition and assumption by the parties, the court is left with the task of determining what the parties would have done had the issue arisen in the contract negotiations.
=> 2 options for allocating risk:
(i) specify in contract
(ii) let court determine intent
Efficiency
guidelines: assign risk to the party who can
(i) best spread (pool) the risk
(ii) best control the risk (F)
"an efficient contract will
usually assign the loss associated with something going wrong to the party with control
over that particular something." (F162)
Commonly, that means the seller: Moral hazard and adverse selection
push in same direction: the promisor usually knows risks better and can prevent them
better
Ex: risks best controlled by the
producer: Risk of strike, factory burning down
Contractors building houses: assigning risk to supplier is logical
since supplier can spread risk more easily and prevent fires (F161)
But not always:
Ex: risks best controlled by the consumer due to moral hazard:
Himalayan photographer. If he doesn't tell the photo labs that his six rolls of film cost
thirty thousand dollars to get, they don't owe him thirty thousand when they lose the
film.
Without moral hazard, risk spreading considerations would => make
photo lab liable.
Ex: landlords and tenants: Assignment
of risk from hazards has shifted over time.
Early days, tenants: most of value was land, not
buildings
Buildings were simple and hazards best
prevented by conduct of tenant
Nowadays: landlords: buildings more valuable relative to land
Many hazards are structural
Consequence--tenants pay higher rent
stare decisis provides guidance but is not binding
In general: "If it is clear that the parties intend the seller to bear the risk...; contract law will...read..a warranty ino the contract of sale." (P113)
Some implicit
contract terms are nonwaivable
Ex: nonwaivable warranty
of habitability for apartments
Disadvantage: Raises product price and
reduces choice
A consumer can shop for a guarantee, etc.
Advantage: More predictable
Lowers shopping costs and perhaps litigation
costs
2. interpreting and modifying contract language Morin Building Products v. Baystone Construction, 717 F. 2d 413 (1983) -- acceptable paint job (P95n3)
Contracts can contain ambiguous, conflicting or mistaken terms
Some general rules:
Ambiguity
: interpreted according to trade practice. Morin v. Baystone: contrasts performance standards: Mistake: the party in the best position to avoid it is
responsible.
Ex: a problem in
transmission, the party that chose the communication medium
IV. Contracts
E. Breaking contracts
One final thing can go wrong: one party may want to break the contract = breach of contract
The contract was presumably
efficient when negotiated
So what could prompt a contemplated break of contract?
(1) less information was
available or
(2) circumstances were different
when the contract was signed than when breach is contemplated
goal: structure incentives to ensure only
efficient breach of contract
encourage efficient
breach--a breach which makes the parties on net better off
discourage inefficient breach--there was competition when the contract was signed but bilateral monopoly when
breach is contemplated; avoid opportunistic
breach
Under the Coase theorem,
efficient contracts are never breached even without enforcement.
"As long as transaction costs are sufficiently low, contracts
worth fulfilling will be fulfilled." (F163-4)
Regardless of whether contracts are unenforceable or if specific
performance is required. (F163)
As usual, it is only because of transaction costs that breach of
contract cases reach the courts
2 issues to consider
1. Economic analysis of breach of contract
2. The law regarding breach of contract
Contract damages can get pretty messy. As Posner notes, "There are a bewildering variety of possibilities" (P118) -- we will focus on a few key ones
1. Economic analysis of breach of contract
Ex: You contract to go on a
cruise following graduation
Pay for your reservation / Buy a bunch of
travel gear / make reservations at various locations
a. Alternative outcomes
Before
contract: a Scenario 1: You
have a great trip Scenario 2: Right before departure, tour company cancels: you sue reliance damages: costs
incurred in reliance on performance of the contract |
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Outcome | Damages | Consumption point | |
(1) | No damages | 0 | b |
(2) | Reliance damages | ab | a |
(3) | Expectation damages | be | e |
(4) | Specific performance | -- | f |
Which option ensures breach only if it is efficient?