Outcomes under alternative negligence rules
Cost allocation tables in the event of an injury
General information: | |
1. | Total loss if an injury occurs = 100, divided between the parties. For example, if the victim collects damages equal to the loss, then victim cost = 0 and injurer cost = 100. |
2. | If you expect a loss = 100 whether or not you are negligent, you choose not to be negligent, since you internalize the entire loss and you gain from all cost-justified safeguards. |
3. | If you expect a loss = 0 whether or not you are negligent, you choose to be negligent, since you internalize none of the loss, so you gain nothing from spending on costly safeguards. |
To do: | |
1. | Complete the cost allocation table. |
2. | Decide which cell the parties will end up in. |
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Case 1: Simple negligence:
\victim cost |
Victim negligent? | ||||
a. Yes | b. No | ||||
Injurer negligent? | 1. Yes | a1 | \
\ |
b1 |
\ 0 |
2. No | a2 | \ \ |
b2 | \ \ |
Case 2: Contributory negligence:
\ victim cost |
Victim negligent? | ||||
a. Yes | b. No | ||||
Injurer negligent? | 1. Yes | a1 | \
\ |
b1 |
\ 0 |
2. No | a2 | \ \ |
b2 | \ \ |
Case 3: Comparative negligence (with qi = injurer's share of negligence)
\ victim cost |
Victim negligent? | ||||
a. Yes | b. No | ||||
Injurer negligent? | 1. Yes | a1 | \
\ |
b1 |
\ 0 |
2. No | a2 | \ \ |
b2 | \ \ |