Monday, January 07, 2013 |
D. Liability
2. Negligence
Adams
(p) v. Bullock (d), 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E.
93 (1919)
p=boy burned by
contact with electrical; d=trolley company
negligence requires that harm be foreseeable
what does unforeseeable mean?
information costs are too high to make it efficient to discover the unforeseeable harm (Posner) Bullock passed the negligence test. => total loss is at least as high as foreseeable loss |
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What level of
foreseeability is required for liability?
Option 1: specific: the actual harm in the case
Option 2: general: a foreseeable risk of harm (as evidenced
by the actual harm in the case)
United
States (p) v. Carroll Towing Co. (d,app), 159 F.2d 169 (1947)
Cast: The Conners Marine Co., Inc., was the
owner of the barge, ['Anna C'] which the Pennsylvania Railroad Company had chartered; the
Grace Line, Inc., was the charterer of the tug, 'Carroll,' of which the Carroll Towing
Co., Inc., was the owner. U.S. is a claimant on the lost
cargo. Grace Line: chartered tug Carroll to get the barge, after which Anna C got free and
sank. Grace Line blamed for its harbor master not ensuring Anna C was secure; all blame
Anna C for absence of bargee. Grace Line and Carroll both blamed for not ensuring secure
line for Anna C and held responsible for collision damage; but absence of bargee held
responsible for 1/3 of sinking damages.
See
Diagram
explicitly states the classic negligence rule
"if the probability
be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less
than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL."
Judge: Learned
Hand
Hand formula: B < P·L
Econ formula: MCs < |dPr/dS·L|
We call B the marginal cost of safeguards (MCs) and stipulate that P is the marginal change in probability of injury |dP/dS|, but the court decision explicitly aims at defining negligence in economic terms: the failure to take cost-justified precautions.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. (1947) is one of the most famous of all tort cases, with a famous judge
perhaps the most famous
and respected US judge who never served on the Supreme Court. (served on 2d circuit court
of appeals)
full name: Billings Learned Hand
served 52 years, until his death in 1961 (officially retired in 1951)
Famous in antitrust: his 1945 Alcoa decision made monopoly virtually
per se illegal (and was designated a Supreme Court precedent since the S.Ct. could not
come up with a quorum)
Combining both cases:
To be liable under a negligence rule, a harm
must be:
(1) foreseeable through cost-justified anticipation of harm
(2) avoidable through cost-justified precautions
(against foreseeable harm)
it is logically consistent to
use foreseeable harm to decide whether negligence has occurred and then actual harm to
determine damages
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "the measure of the defendant's
duty in determining whether a wrong has been committed is one thing, the measure
of liability when a wrong has been committed is another.". . (Palsgraf dissent)
3. Victim fault
Under a negligence rule,
victim fault becomes an issue only if the defendant is negligent
Otherwise, we have only an accident, not a tort, and the case is over
a. Alternatives under the law
Option 1: simple negligence
Defendant negligence =>
automatic liability
No follow-up consideration of victim behavior
Example: Winn-Dixie
The cases in this section go beyond simple negligence.
Butterfield
v. Forrester, King's Bench, 11 East 60 (1809)
p = horse rider/victim; d = homeowner/injurer
Illustrates Option 2: "contributory
negligence"
=> after asking whether the defendant had been negligent and
concluding that he had (if he had not, that would be the end of the case), ... ask whether
the plaintiff had been negligent. If the answer is "yes," the plaintiff loses.
(P173)
from the case: "One person being in fault will not dispense with
another's using ordinary care for himself."
Contributory negligence is necessary but not sufficient to excuse the injurer
from liability; the contributory negligence must be a proximate cause at the
time of the injury
Example: if the rider would have have hit the obstruction
even at a reasonable speed, then the injurer would have remained liable
Illustrated by Berry v. Sugar Notch
Davies
v. Mann, 10 M. & w. 547, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842)
plaintiff = donkey owner; defendant = wagon
owner
illustrates
the doctrine of "last clear chance"
last clear chance can override contributory negligence
components of
"last clear chance":
"(1) That plaintiff has been
negligent and, as a result thereof, is in a position of danger from which he cannot escape
by the exercise of ordinary care; and this includes not only where it is physically
impossible for him to escape, but also in cases where he is totally unaware of his danger
and for that reason unable to escape; (2) that defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff
is in such a situation, and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should know, that
plaintiff cannot escape from such situation; and (3) has the last clear chance to avoid
the accident by exercising ordinary care, and fails to exercise the same, and the accident
results thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of such failure.'" (Perin v. Nelson & Sloan (1953))
(1) plaintiff
endangered by own negligence
(2) a reasonable defendant would recognize the danger
(3) the defendant fails to exercise ordinary care in a last clear
chance to avoid the accident
=> an incentive to always
exercise ordinary care
the negligence of others does not excuse us from that obligation
Contrast the two cases:
who had the "last clear chance" in
(1) Butterfield v. Forrester? the injured plaintiff,
whose contributory negligence excuses the injurer from liability (plaintiff
"is the author of his own wrong")
(2) Davies v. Mann?
the injuring defendant, so contributory negligence
by the injured plaintiff does not excuse the injurer from liability
Dobson (p) v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (d), 567 So. 2d 569 (1990)
As in Butterfield v. Forrester, the court acknowledges victim negligence: "Actual lack of knowledge by victim is not sufficient to find lack of victim fault: "Any person is required by law to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing harm to himself if a reasonable person would do so while exercising such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, intelligence and judgment as a reasonable person would have.... [Plaintiff's] failure to take precautions to avoid the risk of which he should have known amounted to negligence."
Illustrates Option 3: Comparative negligence: "We do not think that the unreasonableness of [defendant's] conduct was so great as to be double the fault of [plaintiff]. But we conclude that a palpable majority of the fault should be attributed to the [defendant] in order to achieve substantial justice in this case. Accordingly, we attribute 60% of the negligence herein to [defendant] and 40% to [plaintiff].
b. Economic analysis of legal options
i = injurer v = victim efficient level of combined precautions: efficiency => both sides must internalize L. |
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Option 1:
simple negligence: victim collects if Si < Si*
Option 2: contributory negligence: victim collects if Si < Si*
and
Sv > Sv*
Option 3: comparative
negligence: victim collects qi of loss, where
qi = the
injurer's share of combined negligence:
= (Si* - Si) / [(Si* - Si) + (Sv* -
Sv)]