B. Making contracts (finish)
3. Implicit contracts
contracts implied by law
Cotnam
(d,app)
v. Wisdom (p), 104 S.W. 164 (1907)
Wisdom = P (doctor);
Cotnam = D (administrator)
implicit contracts allow providers of emergency services to collect "fair compensation" for "time, service, and skill."
a "negative liability rule" (a Pigouvian subsidy). (F160)
increases incentive for assistance during emergencies when bargaining is costly or impossible
Notice: the basis for recovery = cost,
not benefit
Ex: Christian Scientist--costs just as much
From the supply side, it is irrelevant--it costs just as much to treat
him
but it isn't worth as much--from the demand side, the value of the
treatment is zero
The right rule would seem to be no payment if the treatment is
unwanted, and a payment if the treatment is wanted scaled up a little to compensate the
doctor for the risk that his patient will turn out to be a Christian Scientist, but ...
That rule would be an invitation to fraud--by people who converted to
Christian Science after receiving the Doctor's bill. (F)
Current fashion: to base case on "unjust enrichment" (P135)
Ordinarily must get
permission, since "a property rule usually moves services to their highest-valued use
more cheaply and reliably than a liability rule." (F160)
"But now suppose that a man
stands under my window, playing the violin beautifully, and when he has finished knocks on
my door and demands a fee for his efforts. Though I enjoyed his playing I nonetheless
refuse to pay anything for it. The court would deny the violinist's claim for a
fee--however reasonable the fee might appear to be--on the ground that, although the
violinist conferred a benefit on me (and not with the intent that it be gratuitous), he
did so officiously. Translated from legal into economic terminology, this means he
conferred an unbargained-for benefit in circumstances where the costs of a voluntary
bargain would have been low. " (P136)
C. Enforcing contracts
Recall that court enforcement is not always necessary
Alternatives:
(1) Reputation and desire for repeat dealings, etc.
But, in order for reputation with third parties to be relevant, third
parties must have some way of knowing which party to the contract failed to live up to his
agreements.
Places an advantage on small, closeknit societies.
(2)
Arbitration
either after the fact with an arbitrator who has a good reputation, or
by the parties agreeing on the arbitrator when they sign the
contract--and making the fact public then
Ex: former dominance of the diamond industry in NY by orthodox jews Who
were forbidden by their religion from suing each other, but had good
arbitration/reputation institutions.
(3) Commitment
Formally: posting a bond with a bonding agency that has a good
reputation.
Informally: giving hostages
Public announcement of a joint
project; if it later falls through, both parties look bad.
Generally, making it possible for the other party to injure you--in a
way which isn't profitable for them but available when you break the contract.
But while such mechanisms cover many transactions, there are many more which they don't cover, hence a role for government contract enforcement.
The fundamental question then
becomes: is the contract legally enforceable?
The courts may say no for a variety of reasons
1. Unacceptable parties
2. Unacceptable purpose
3. Unacceptable conditions
1. Unacceptable parties
Incapacity of contracting parties: Children: Ex: Bowling v. Sperry, 133 Ind.App. 692, 184 N.E.2d 901 (1962): a minor was allowed not only to disaffirm a contract (for purchasing a car) but to get his money backMental incompetent: Ex: Heights Realty, LTD. v. Phillips, 106 N.M. 692, 749 P.2d 77 (1988): an exclusive listing contract between a mental incompetent and a broker was held invalid.
2. Unacceptable purpose
Contracts which impose costs on 3rd parties
illegal contracts: murder, restraint of
trade, agreement not to testify (except for spouses)
Drug contracts. Unenforceability by courts --> enforcement by
gangs/violence
Ex: 2 cowp. 729, 98 Eng. Rep. 1331 (K.B. 1778). "a suit to enforce a wager that Chevalier d'Eon was actually a woman" ruled unenforceable as injurious to chevalier. (P109)
Ex: Goodier
v. Hamilton 172 Wash. 60; 19 P.2d 392; (1933): refused to enforce payment of a
"broker's fee" for locating an attorney that procured government authorization
for a trucking service route: "Where, as in the case at bar, the agreement suggests the use of sinister and corrupt
means for the accomplishment of the end desired, 'The law meets the suggestion of evil,
and strikes down the contract from its inception.'"
The court leaves the party where it finds them
3. Unacceptable conditions
Key situations: fraud and situational monopoly
a. Fraud
Harding (p,app) v. Ja Laur Corp. (d) 20 Md. App. 209 , 315 A. 2d 132 (1974)
Illustrates fraud: providing
false information voids a contract only between the original parties
Illustrates forgery: voids original and subsequent contracts
Stambovsky (p) v. Ackley (d) 169 A.D.2d 254; 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991)
Illustrates fraud by withholding relevant and obscure information