Race, Gender and Justice:
Re-thinking Representation |
||
Race/Gender/Sexuality
& Citizenship |
Reading | Cott, Nancy. "Justice for All? Marriage
and Deprivation of Citizenship in the United States." Justice and Injustice in
Law and Legal Theory. Eds. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns. Ann Arbor, MI: The
University of Michigan Press, 1998. 77-97. Haney López, Ian F. "Restrictions in the Law of Citizenship." White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race." New York and London: New York University Press. 1996. 37-47. Eskridge & Hunter. "Boutilier vs. INS." Sexuality,
Gender and the Law. New York: The Foundation Press, 1997. 170-189. |
Goal | To get an appreciation of the way in which gender, race and sexuality complicate the notion of citizenship by looking at how immigration law has treated these characteristics. |
We'll discuss the connections between citizenship and the formation of the
"nation" through the ways in which regulation by analyzing Cott.
Nature of marriage law: You should be aware that marriage is a state and local function. The federal government can not "produce" marriages. However the state can impact which marriages occur by denying or bestowing rights on marriages based on the participants. One study by the General Accounting Office after the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 found that 1049 statutes in which occurrences of "spouse," "wife", "husband" etc were present. So, for example, this is why the cases involving whether someone can get married or not have all been state cases, initially, though in Loving and Pace they end up before the USSC on claims that the state's actions were offending the U.S. constitution. So, one state can set the age of the participants of a marriage at 13, while another can require blood tests. However, the fundamental right to marry can not be abridged or infringed upon by the states. This is the question which comes up in the only two recent cases to deal with marriage: Zablocki vs Redhail (1978) and Turner vs Safely (1987).
The result here was 8-1(5 for the fundamental holding, 3 more for the result). Chief Justice Rehnquist was opposed to strict scrutiny being applied because it would infrnge upon "states' rights" to regulate marriage as they wish.
Zablocki
v. Redhail (1978)
The Court invalidated Wisconsin's bar to remarriage when one partner has unpaid support
obligations from a previous marriage. Emphasizing the state's interference with Loving's
right to marry, the Court held that the law violated the equal protection clause by
discriminating in the allocation of this fundamental right.
Turner
v. Safely (1987)
The Court invalidated Missouri's almost complete bar to marriage by prison inmates.
Although the Court deferred to state rules regulating prisoners, it held that denial of
the right to marry requires more rigorous justification because the unitive and legal
features of marriage are so fundamental in our polity.
Turner is about the reification of a 'fecundity class' of citizens.
(Cott 83): the concept of COVERTURE: a woman upon marriage cedes her legal individuality as well as her property to her husband. Where have we seen examples of this already in class? (The Marrow of Tradition: Major Carteret assuming control over Olivia Carterets home)
Can we think of modern manifestations of the concept of coverture?
QUESTION (10-minute in-class exercise)
How does Cotts piece expose and examine issues surrounding marriage, miscegenation
and citizenship by analyzing these concepts along race and gender lines?