Name $\qquad$ Voting Systems

1. Here is an example of a voter preference table to which we'll apply our various voting methods. The percentages of the voters is given across the top row (For example, $49 \%$ of the voters cast ballots of perference for A first, B second and C third). There are two "major" candidates and one on the "fringe." As you answer each question below, write a sentence or two explaining what you've done.

|  | 49 | 48 | 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | A | B | C |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ | B | A | B |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ | C | C | A |

- Who wins with the Plurality Method?
- Who wins with the Instant Run-off Method?
- Give the Round Robin results below and decide the winner on that basis.

A vs B
A vs C
B vs C

- Let's reconfigure the table for the Borda Method. The first table has the number of votes, and the second has the number of points. Complete the table.

Votes:

|  | A | B | C |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | 49 | 48 | 3 |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ | 48 |  |  |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ |  |  |  |


|  | A | B | C |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | 147 | 144 | 9 |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ |  |  |  |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ |  |  |  |
| Total Points |  |  |  |

Who wins using the Borda method?
2. Secret Gaming. Consider the same example as on the previous page. In order to depress the impact of the second-place votes for B, some of A's supporters cast votes which do not reflect their true preference; they rank C second and B third. These so-called "insincere" votes are indicated with bold type below:

|  | 45 | $\mathbf{4}$ | 48 | 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | A | $\mathbf{A}$ | B | C |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ | B | C | A | B |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ | C | $\mathbf{B}$ | C | A |

Fill out the new Borda votes and points tables below:

Votes:

|  | A | B | C |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | 49 | 48 | 3 |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ | 48 |  |  |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ |  |  |  |


|  | A | B | C |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | 147 | 144 | 9 |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ |  |  |  |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ |  |  |  |
| Total Points |  |  |  |

Who wins using the Borda method?
3. Everybody games $i t$ ! Not wanting to be vulnerable to strategic voting by the other major candidate, all the supporters of A and B cast insincere second place votes for C.

|  | 49 | 48 | 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | A | B | C |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ | C | C | B |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ | B | A | A |

Fill out the Borda tables:

Votes:

|  | A | B | C |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | 49 | 48 | 3 |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ |  |  |  |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ |  |  |  |


|  | A | B | C |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ | 147 | 144 | 9 |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ |  |  |  |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ |  |  |  |
| Total Points |  |  |  |

Who wins using the Borda method?

